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ADDITION OF NEW AUTHORITY 
TO BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 17231 
The Plaintiffs-Appellants, pursuant to Rule 75 (p) (3), 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, submit additional authority in 
support of their position in the above-entitled case. 
Attached hereto as Exhibit "A" is the recent case of 
Panko v. Pan American Federal Savings and Loan Association, 1 
Civil 47918 (Cal. App., filed June 1, 1981). 
The Panko case supports the Appellants' agruments as 
follows: 
1. The Respondent, both in its brief (Respondent's 
brief at 21) and in oral argument, has asserted that the 
California courts have held that it is reasonable and equitable 
to enforce the due-on-sale clause with respect to investment 
property. Panko, however, involved a commercial building. See 
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Pei nko at J • The !:'_a nko court, reversing the lower cour:t deci-
c; ion, specifically recognized the applicability to non-
residential property of Wellenkamp v. Bank of America, 148 Cal. 
Rptr. 379, 582 P.2d 970 (1978). See, Panko at 1 and at n. 3. 
2. At issue in the instant case is the affect, if any, 
of federal regulations authorizing enforcement of due-on-sale 
clauses. The Respondent, which assumes the preemptive effect of 
those regulations contrar:y to the arguments by the Appellants, 
has alleged that the Respondent has the statutory right to en-
force due-on-sale clauses pursuant to statutes of the State of 
Utah. Respondent's br:ief at 21-23. The Panko case, however:, 
involving a federally chartered savings and loan, specifically 
holds that California law is not preempted by federal r:egula-
tions. See, Panko at 13. Using the same analysis and rationale 
of the Panko case, the Appellants ar:gue that the laws of the 
State of Utah should apply with respect to the due-on-sale 
clause. 
DATED this 15th day of June, 1981. 
NE R. SABIN 
Attorney for Appellants 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on the 15th day of June, 1981, I 
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument to be 
hand delivered to Richard W. Giauque, James R. Holbrook and 
Stephen T. Har:d, of Giauque, Holbrook, Bendinger: & Gur:mankin, 
P.C., 500 .Kearns Buil<ling, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, attorneys 
for: Respondent. . ·/~, /} //' /~~ 
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CELTiFlU FOl~ PUDUCATlOM COPY 
I~; -irlt COUHT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT 
DIVISFlN ONE 
STANLEY E. PANKO and GEORGE 
L. S HKLAIP., 
Plaintiffs ~nd Appellants, 
vs. 
PAN AMERICAN FlDERAL SAVINGS 
AND LOAN ASSOCIATIOi~, PAN 
AHERICAN SERVICE CORPORATION, 
Defendants end Respondents. 
JUt-: -11981 
U:urt i~::~~.al- Fir::t ~P- Dist. 
CLJ,' ..,:,., \.. r.ir:n:r., Cl~r~ 
u;~~~~~-=~--,_ 
I.>~ 
l Civil 47918 
(Super.Ct.No. 2279e7) 
In this opp~al we address the question whether the 
rule announced by ou~ Supreme Court in ~ellenkamp v. Sank of 
A~erica (1978) 21 Cal.3d 943 applies with equal force to a 
federally chartered ~avings and loan association. ~e hold that 
Wellenkamc applies; ~ccordingly, we reverse the judgment. 
facts 
Joseph and :,andra Karp were owners of a commercial 
building in San Mateo. In November 1977 they refinanced the 
property, obtaining o loan from Pan American federal Savings 
nnd Loan Association for $161,000, bearing interest at the rate 
l 
or ten percent per ~nnum, secured by a deed of trust. The 
1. The rcflnonclng ·:as part or en option cgreemcmt b~ttteen the 
Kerps ~nd plaintiffs. An nbstract uf option ogreement was (Fn. continued n~xt page.) 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
C': ·u (,f t rw.t cnr1ta.incd a slancJ2:-cl due-on-s0le clause provicJing 
for.<:cCl·lri;itr·ci p0yr;1~·nt in the event of sale. 
Ir1 Jurw 1970 the Varps sold th<:: property to plain-
tiffs, Starilcy P0nko and George Sinclair, who took title to the 
property "subject to" the Pan American deed of trust. Plain-
tiffs tendered a timely monthly payment due to Pan American in 
July 1978, but Pan American declined to accept it. Acting 
under the authority of the due-on-sale clause, Pan American 
demanded full payment of the loan balance. 
On August 16, 1978, Pan American recorded a Notice of 
Default citing the Karps' "failure to pay Interest and Princi-
pal payments." On November 21, 1978, plaintiffs filed a com-
plaint for declaratory and injunctive relief seeking to enjoin 
Pan American from enforcing the due-on-sale clause. There-
after, Pan American noved for summary judgment on the ground 
that federal statutes and regulations governing federally 
chartered savings and loan associations preempted California 
law and permitted enrorcement of the due-on-sale clause. The 
trial court granted the motion and dismissed the action. This 
appeal ensued. 
recorded on November 13, 1977. A termination of option agree-
~ent ~as recorded on December 2, 1977. An abstract of option 
agreement ~as re-recorded on December 5, 1977. Thus, at the 
time of the Karps' refinancing (November 28, 1977), Pan Ameri-
can had constructive notice of plaintiffs' option to purchase 
the property. 
2 
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8<Jckr'round 
In reren~ yr~rs the validity of due-on-sale clauses 
hcis tn:f'n <J ~atter of corisioerable controversy in state and 
feder<ll courts. In California our Supreme Court has determined 
that enforcement of a due-on-sale clause upon occurrence of an 
outright sale constitutes an unreasonable restraint on aliena-
tian "unless the lencer can demonstrate that enforcement is 
reasonably necessary to protect against impairment to its 
security or the risk of default." (Wellenkamp v. Bank of 
America, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 953.) 1 The court's decision was 
grounded on Civil Code section 711, 2 foreshadowed by two 
earlier interpretations of that statute. (See Tucker v. Lassen 
Sav. & Loan Assn. (1J74) 12 Cal.3d 629 [due-on-sale clause not 
automatically enforceable upon execution of installment sale 
contract]; LaSala v. American Sav. & Loan Assn. (1971) 5 Cal.3d 
864 [acceleration clause not automatically enforceable upon 
creation of junior encumbrance].) 
Here, Pan ~merican concedes that it can make no show-
ing of an impairment to its security or risk of default as a 
result of the outright sale of the property to plaintiffs~ 
Consequently, under California law the due-on-sale clause 
contained in the deed of trust herein would not be 
2. Section 711 of ~he Civil Code provides: "Conditions 
restninirig alienation, ~hen repugnant to the interest created, 
are void." 
3 
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i,1 rcf_,c,:r- 5 f'0r1 A•;,, rican, a ft::chc:rally chartered savings 
zir1:J :ic,_1r1 ,•,sci-:iatiori, contends thJt it can not b~ bound by 
Califo:-nia 1,a 0 sir1ce it is exclusively governed by regulations 
of th~ Federal Home Lo2n 8Jnk Board (Board) which preempt con-
flicting state laws. 
In 1933 the Home Owners' Loan Act (12 U.S.C. §§ 1461-
1470) was enacted by Congress creating the Board and authoriz-
ing the establishment of federal savings and loan associa-
tions. While the associations are specifically empowered to 
extend real estate leans (12 U.S.C. § l464 {c)(l)(B) and 
(c)(2)(A)), the statute ls silent with respect to due-on-sale 
clauses or other loan details. 
The Board is statutorily authorized to promulgate 
regulations 4 and has shown no reluctance to do so. (See 12 
3. We note that in ~ellenkamn the property was an owner-
occupied single fami)y d•elling, whereas here the property is 
investment commercial property. While we are aware that a 
similar question is presently pending before the California 
Supreme Court (Dawn Investment Co. v. Superior Court (L.A. 
31413) hg. gr. April 27, 1981), we perceive no sound reasons to 
n_Q_w restrict the ~elle11kamp doctrine exclusively to residential 
pToperty. 
4. "In order to provide local mutual thrift Institutions in 
which people may inv~st their funds and in order to provide for 
the financing of ho~~s. the Board ls authorized, under such 
rules and regulations as it may prescribe, to provide for the 
organi:ation, inco"p~ration, examination, operation, and 
regulation of cssoclJtions to be known as 'Federal Savings and 
Loan Associations', or 'Federal mutual savings banks' (but only 
in the case of instltutions which, prior to conversion, were 
State mutual savinos banks located in States which authorize 
the chartering of State mutual savings banks, provided such 
conversion is not !n contravention of State law), end to issue 
(Fn. continued next page.) 
4 
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L . F . f • P. :i ;: ·_. ', '' \ - ', 1• G . ) H1 e f i rs t spec i f i c men t i on o f due - 0 .-, _ 
:i~~r~ cl0usec-;, however, did not appear until a regulation was 
enacted, effective July l, 1976, providing as follows: "An 
assor:iation continues to have the power to include, as a matter 
of contract between it and the borrower, a provision in its 
loan instrument whereby the association may, at its option, 
declare immediately due and payable sums secured by the associ-
ation's security instrument if all or any part of the real 
property securing the loan is sold or transferred by the bar-
rower ~ithout the association's prior written consent. Except 
as provided in paragraph (g) of this section with respect to 
loans made after July 31, 1976, on the security of a home 
occupied or to be occupied by the borrower, exercise by the 
association of such option (hereafter called a due-on-sale 
clause) shall be exclusively governed by the terms of the loan 
contract, and all rights and remedies of the association and 
borrower shall be fixed and governed by that contract." (12 
C.F.R. § 545.6-11 (f), amended and recodified at § 545.8-3 (f) 
0980).) 
The pivotal question to be decided is whether the 
federal regulation overrides state law embodied in California 
Civil Code section 711, as interpreted in Wellenkamo. 
charters therefor, ~iving primary consideration to the best 
precticcs of local ~utual thrift and home-financing institu-
tions in the United States." (12 ll-.5.C. § 1464, subd. (a){l).) 
5 
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Federal Preemption 
The pree~ption doctrine arises under th~ supremacy 
clause of t~e federal constitution which states: "This Consti-
tution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made 
in pursuance thereof; . shall be the supreme law of the 
land; and th~ Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, 
anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the con-
trary notwithstanding." (U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2.) But 
the enumerated powers of the federal government are expressly 
I 
limited: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor ~rohibited by it to the States, are reserved 
to the States respectively, or to the people.~ (U.S. Const., 
Amend. X.) The United States Supreme Court has exhibited con-
siderable restraint in finding federal preemption of state law 
by requiring either "such actual conflict bet~een the two 
schemes of regulation that both cannot stand in the same area, 
[or] • . evidence of a congressional design to preempt the 
field." (Florida Avocado Growers v. Paul (1963) 373 U.S. 132, 
141; accord People v. Conklin (1974) 12 Cal.3d 259, 264, app. 
dism. 419 U.S. 1064.) 
With reference to congressional intent, the United 
States Supreme Court has declared that a state regulation exer-
cising the state's "historic police powers" is not displaced by 
federal law "unless that was the clear and manifest ~uroose of 
Congress." {Jones v. Rath Packinq Co. {1977) 430 U.S. 519, 
525; Ri~e v. Santa Fe Elevator Coip, (1947) 331 U.S. 218, 
6 
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2}C. i Co'1.1· .• J h;n·e not cited nor has our own resea;-ch dis-
clu~,_·d any reported e·;idence of a clear congressional mandate 
that federal l~w shall control the subject matter herein. 
While the Congress ha~ unequivocally expressed its preemptive 
design in relation to specific areas of savings and loan 
association activlties, 5 the Home Owners' Loan Act makes no 
reference to the subject of due-on-sale clauses. 
It is clear that the Board has manifested its unquali-
fied intention that the adopted regulations and implementing 
policy relating to due-on-sale clauses 'shall occupy a preemp-
tive position over conflicting state law provisions. 6 Such 
expression of administrative intent was found controlling in 
Glendale Fed. Sav. b. loan Ass'n. v. Fox (C.O.Cal. 1978) 459 
5. The Home Owners' loan Act specifically provides that feder-
al savings and "loan 2ssociations are exempt from state limita-
tions on the number of branch offices (12 U.S.C. § l464(a)(l)),· 
but ore not exempt from more stringent state ·1aws on neighbor-
hood discrimination or consumer credit protection. (laid.) 
Further, federal savings end loan associations are exempt from 
state taxation greater than that imposed on local financing 
institutions. (Id., ot § l464(h).) 
6. That intent is expressed in the following language: 
"Finally, it was and is the Board's intent to have ••• due-
on-sale practices of Federal associations governed exclu-
sively by Federal la·o. Therefore, ••• exercise of due-on-
sale clauses by Federal associations shall be governed and 
controlled solely by § 545.6-11 and the Board's new Statement 
of Policy. Federal ~ssoclations shall not be bound by or 
Gubject to any confl~cting State law ~hich imposes differ-
ent ••• due-on-sal~ requirement~, nor shall Federal associa-
tions attempt to •.• avoid the limitations on the exercise of 
due-on-sale clauses delineated in § 545.6-ll(g) on the ground 
that such .•• avoidance of limitations is permissible under 
State law." (Preamble to 12 C.F.R. part 545.6-11, 41 Fed.Reg. 
18 2 8 7 (I lay 3, 19 7 6) . ) 
- 7 
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F.Supµ. 90J, judcpe'r1t entered, 481 F.Supp. 616 (1979), appe;:il 
pending (9th Cir. 1979). But we cannot equate the Hoard's 
expression of intent with the requisite congressional intent 
sir>ce the ultirc,ate question to be an~wered is "whether Conaress 
has . ordained that the state regulation shall yield." 
(Florida Avocado Growers v. Paul, supra, 373 U.S. at p. 146; 
emphasis added.) 
But despite the lack of express congressional design, 
federal law by implication may operate to the exclusion of 
state law "where.compliance with bath federal and state regula-
tions ls a physical impassibility" or where there is an "im-
possibility of dual compliance . • resulting .. in an 
inevitable collision between the two schemes of regula-
tion, ••• " (Florida Avocado Growers v. Paul, supra, 373 u.s: 
at pp. 142-143.) 
In an early case a federal district court - confronted 
with the question whether a federally chartered savings and 
loan association was required to obtain a state certificate to 
transact business in the state - held in favor of federal pre-
emption reasoning th~t: "The [Home Loan Bank) Board has · 
adopted comprehensive rules and regulations concerning the 
powers and operations of every federal savings and loan essoci-
a tion from its cradle to its corporate grave." (People, etc. 
v. Coast Federal Sav. & Loan Ass•n. (S.O.Cal. 1951) 98 f.Supp. 
311, 316.) This broad declaration of lifetime supremacy has 
been cited with approval in a number of subsequent decisions 
- B 
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ui1ifn1mly holu1nr.; tl1:cit ~Lite Liv. may not regulate or otherwise 
inLcrfere v.itr1 thl: internal affairs of federal savings and loan 
associations. (See e.g. Conference of Federal Sav. & Loan 
!1.ssn's v. Stein (9th Cir. 1979) 604 F.2d 1256, aff'd. 445 U.S. 
921 [proceedings for credit discrimination); Kupiec v. Republic 
Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n (7th Cir. 1975) 512 F.2d 147, 150 
[use of membership records); Meyers v. Beverly Hills Federal 
Savings & Loan Ass'n (9th Cir. 1974) 499 F.2d 1145, 1147 (pre-
payment penalties); Rettig v. Arlington Hghts. Fed. Sav. & Loan 
Ass'n (N.0.111 .. 1975) 405 F.Supp. 819,1 823 [fiduciary obliga-
tions of directors and officers]; City Federal Savings & Loan 
Ass'n v. Cro-.ley (E.D.Wisc. 1975) 393 F.Supp. ,644, 655 [fees 
received by directors and officers]; Kaski v. first Fed. s & L 
Ass'n of Madison (1976) 72 Wisc.2d 132 [240 N.W.2d 367][inter~ 
est rate escalation]; Sears v. First Federal Savings and L. 
Ass'n of Chicago (1971) 1 Ill.App.Jct 621 [275 N.E.2d 300) 
[trust accounts for taxes and insurance]; see also Oerenco, 
Inc. v. Benj. Franklin Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass•n (1978) 281 Or. 
533 (577 P.2d 477], cert. den. 439 U.S. 1051.) 
Although that general proposition reflects a correct 
statement of law, ~~ are not per~uaded that exfstina state law 
pertaininq to the CXP.rcise of due-on-sale Clauses in any way 
infringes uoon or is otherwise incompatible with the requlation 
or operation of the internal affairs of federal savinqs end 
loan associations. (See Holid~v Acres v. Midwest Fed. Sev. & 
Loan Ass'n (April J, 1981, No. 338) Minn. ___ .) The 
9 
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feder~l r~g~l~t1on m~~ely authorizes and does not compel sav-
ing~ and loar1 associations to include a due-on-sale clause in 
. 
their loan sontracts and to exercise their rights thereunder . 
• (Id., at pp. 14-15.) As noted, California law imposes a 
more stringent requir~ment enforcing a due-on-sale clause only 
upon a showing that the lender's security will be either 
impaired or subjected to risk of default as a conse~uence of 
the transfer. But the federal loan association is not faced 
with physical impossibility in complying with the two regula-
tory schemes. Instead, the federal regulation leaves the 
rights and remedies of the parties intact under the terms of 
the loan contract. Thus, enforcement of the due-on-sale clause 
rests upon conventioral contract and property principles under 
state law. (Id., at p 10.) There ls no "inevitable collision" 
between the two regulations. (Florida Avocado Growers v. Paul, 
supra, at p 143.) 
The Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC), 
appearing as amicus curiae, urges e finding of federal preemp-
tion based on a claim of need for national uniformity of loan 
practices and lnstruments. 7 In response, we rely upon the 
• Typed opinion p~ges 14-15. 
7. Briefly stated, the argument ls made that due-on-sale 
clauses, by keeptng the life of a mortgage relatively short, 
increase the lenders' yield end thereby promote the national 
interest by keeping overall interest rates down. Further, by 
providing a higher yield and a rapid return of capital to the 
(fn. continued next page.) 
10 
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persuJsiv~ lan~uJc1e of the Minnes8la Supreme Court: "If thi 5 
national interest were indeed an important policY., it seems 
that the in~lusion of such clauses would be mandated rather 
than permitted." (Holiday Acres v. Midwest Red. Sav. & Loan 
Ass'n, supra, p. 15.) Nor, we think, would application of 
state la~ to the exercise of due-on-sale clauses interfere with 
the federal objectives embodied in the Home Owners' Loan Act. 
That legislation was enacted during a period of severe economic 
depression in order to asoist financially distressed home-
owners., It would be "unreasonable, and ironic, to hold now 
that the Congress intended [the act] to justify the removal of 
homeowners' protections under state law." (Id., at p. 17.) 
Our conclusion finds further support in the particular 
provisions of the deed of trust employed herein. The form of 
instrument is apparently one promulgated by the FHLMC itself; 
its use is a precondition to purchase of the mortgage by 
FHLMC. The trust in~trument contains so-called "uniform" and 
"non-uniform" covenants. The uniform covenants are intended 
for nationwide use while the non-uniform covenants ere tailored 
B to particular state mortgage requirements. For example~ the 
lenders, due-on-sale clauses render the loans marketable in the 
secondary mortgage ~arket, thereby attracting new funds to the 
QOrtgage market and, in turn, again keeping interest rates 
down. FHLMC, as purchaser of conventional mortgages, will 
purchase only those mortgages using the standardized f.HLMC/FNMA 
loan instrument employed here. 
8. Paragraph 15 of the deed of trust provides: "This form (fn. continued next page.) 
11 
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"non-uniform" covenants employed herein include California 
sta~utoiy requirements regarding notice (Civ. Code, § 2924(b)) 
reinstatem~nt (Civ. Code, § 2924(c)) and the furnishing of a 
statement of obligation (Civ. Code, § 2943). 
Included- in the "uniform" covenants found in paragraph 
15 is the express proviso that: "This Deed of Trust shall be 
qoverned by the law of the jurisdiction in which the Property 
is located. In the event that any provision or clause of this 
Deed of Trust or Note conflicts with applicable law, such con-
fllct shall not affect other provisions •• 
" (Emphasis 
added.) We believe such language expresses an unmistakable 
intention that state law s~all govern the int~rpretation, vali-
dity and enforcement of the loan-security instrument. 
Waiver 
Notwithstanding the relevant federal regulation, 
federal savings and loan associations are authorized to waive 
their rights under the due-on-sale clause. 9 Thus, it has 
deed of trust combines uniform covenants for national us~ and 
non-uniform covenants with limited variations by jurisdiction 
to constitute a uniform security instrument covering real 
property. This Deed of Trust shall be governed by the law of 
the jurisdiction in ~hich the Property is located. In the 
event that any provision or clause of this Deed of Trust or 
Note conflicts ~ith applicable law, such conflict shall not 
affect other provisions •••• " 
9. Under the Board's statement of policy, savings and loan 
associations are empowered to waive their rights under the 
due-on-sale clause: "The Board believes there may be (in 
(Fn. continued next page.) 
12 
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been held that where ~ federal agency contracts with a private 
individuJl and the contract provides that state }aw governs the 
contract, state law will apply even in the face of general 
federal preemption. (United States v. Stewart (9th Cir. 1975) 
523 F.2d 1070 [California's anti-deficiency judgment statute 
controls where trust deed provided for interpretation under 
California law]; see United States v. Yazell (1966) 382 U.S. 
341, 353.) Since the subject deed of trust contains a similar 
provision invoking the "law of the jurisdiction in which the 
property is situated" in construing th~t instrument, we con-
clude that Pan American federal Savings and Loan Association 
has effectively waived any claim of federal preemption. 
In conclusion, we hold that California law is not 
preempted by virtue of the relevant federal regulation. There~ 
fore, we reverse the judgment and remand for further 
addition to the circumstance prescribed in§ 545.8-3(g) in 
which exercise of a due-on-•ale clause ls prohibited) situ-
ations in ~hich it ~ill be appropriate for a federal associa-
tion to uaive its contractual right to accelerate a loan. 
Those situations include transfer of title to members of the 
borrower's immediate family, including a former spouse in 
connection uith a divorce, who occupy or will occupy.the pro-
perty (to the extent not covered by.§ 545.8-3(g)). Associa-
tions also should consider waiving, in cases of extreme hard-
ship to the existino borrower, any right to require en increase 
in interest rate under a due-on-sale clause." (12 C.F.R. § 
556.9(c).) 
13 
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pro cc e d iri gs '- o 11 c, \ ', t. l' r, t w i th the views expressed herein. 
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